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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the features of general Franco's regime, which lasted from 1939 to 1975, 
was the absence of a modern income tax system of the type we have come to expect 
in a democratic state. However, shortly after it was elected in 1978, the first Spanish 
democratic parliament adopted a progressive income tax, the Impuesto sobre la 
Renta de las Personas Fisicas (IRPF for short), which will be analyzed in the 
sequel. Since its inception, the IRPF has been subject to several reforms. Here we 
concentrate in a comparison between the 1986 and 1988 versions. Between these 
two years, two major changes took place. On the one hand, there were changes in 
average and marginal tax rates. On the other hand, the 1986 IRPF was a family tax, 
combined with a fixed tax credit for every earner and a variable deduction 
determined as a function of the incomes of the first two wage earners. In 1988, as 
a consequence of a sentence passed by the Supreme Court (Tribunal Consti-
tutional), the possibility of filling in separate returns for earners of the same family 
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was introduced. At the same time, the variable deduction was reformed in order to 
provide an incentive for tax units to fill in joint returns. 
Since behavioral responses are beyond the scope of this chapter, we shall concern 
ourselves exclusively with the evaluation of the IRPF in the light of the classical 
principles of horizontal and vertical equity which demand, respectively, equal 
treatment of equals and different treatment of unequals. In a heterogeneous world 
in which tax units differ not only in income but in non-income characteristics, these 
principles are applied in equivalent or adjusted income space. 
We use a traditional social welfare framework, where social or aggregate welfare 
is summarized by two statistics of the income distribution: the mean, and an index 
of relative or absolute vertical inequality. Thus, on the one hand, the greater the 
reduction of inequality, usually known as the redistributive effect (RE for short), 
the better. But on the other hand, since tax payments are extracted from individuals, 
their after tax welfare is certainly reduced.1 This revenue effect (REVE for short) 
manifests itself at the social level as a reduction in mean disposable income. 
In a second step, following Lambert and Ramos (1996) the RE is decomposed 
into horizontal and vertical components (HI and VR, respectively, for short). This 
decomposition requires additively separable measurement instruments. Ideally, the 
additive separability property should be applied to the partition by exact equals in 
adjusted income space. However, one of the well known difficulties in the meas-
urement of horizontal inequality is that in the real world one seldom encounters 
two tax units with the same income.2 As a way out, we follow again Lambert and 
Ramos in widening the notion of "exact equals" to "close similars" (or simply, 
similars) in the empirical part.3 
The main novelties we introduce are the following three. 
1. Consider the demographic characteristics usually taken into account in the 
definition of adjusted income. Designers of personal income systems do realize that 
it would be horizontally inequitable if, in spite of differences in size and composi-
tion, two tax units with the same income were to be charged the same tax. To avoid 
these inequities, the IRPF grants tax credits as a function of these characteristics, 
implicitly defining what we may call a fiscal equivalence scale. In many cases, 
including the Spanish one, the fiscal authority appears to follow an absolute notion 
of inequality in the treatment of family characteristics: all tax units with identical 
number and types of dependents are granted the same tax credit independently of 
their income. However, all empirical studies we know of adopt a concept of relative 
inequality. In the relative framework, when tax units of the same characteristics are 
given the same tax credit, there is an improvement in relative inequality. On our 
part, we thought interesting to experiment with an absolute framework in which 
such family tax credits do not cause a change in absolute inequality. 
Absolute notions of inequality and welfare constitute one of the polar cases 
discussed in the theoretical literature,4 but are seldom used in the empirical work. 
A convenient consequence of adopting an absolute framework, is that the expres-
sion for the social welfare change (SWC for short) induced by the tax system, 
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becomes equal to the RE plus the REVE. On the other hand, when we add the 
additive separability property to the usual ones, Blackorby and associates (1981) 
establish that in the absolute case we end up necessarily with the family of 
Kolm-Pollak welfare and inequality measures. This settles the question of the 
choice of measurement instruments. 
As income distribution analysts, we assume that the only ethically relevant 
characteristic is tax unit size. We follow Buhmann and associates (1988) and 
Coulter and associates (1992a, 1992b)'s idea of parametrizing the value judgements 
implicit in the definition of adjusted income. We apply this methodology, making 
sure that the income adjustment procedure does not change the absolute inequality 
of the subgroups within the basic partition by tax unit size.5 
2. The IRPF can be described in terms of the following four main elements: (i) 
the notion of pre-tax income; (ii) the taxable income, which is equal to pre-tax 
income less allowable exemptions; (iii) the tax schedule, which taxes differently 
regular as opposed to irregular income; and (iv) a number of tax credits to be 
deducted from the gross tax to reach the tax liability. After-tax income is equal to 
pre-tax income less tax liability. 
However, in this chapter we view the IRPF as the combination of a tax schedule 
on unadjusted pre-tax income, and a set of adjustments introduced by the fiscal 
authority for very different reasons, some having to do with the avoidance of 
horizontal inequities and some not. An advantage of this point of view, is that the 
Hi usually measured in the literature can be seen to consist of two parts: the ///due 
to the exemptions and tax credits not based on equity considerations, and what we 
may call unintended HI arising from: (i) the practice of applying a progressive tax 
schedule to unadjusted incomes followed by family tax credits, rather than applying 
directly the tax schedule to income adjusted by family circumstances; (ii) differ-
ences between the analyst's equivalence scale and the implicit fiscal scale, both 
based only on demographic characteristics, and (iii) the existence of other charac-
teristics, ignored by the analyst but taken as ethically relevant by the fiscal authority. 
Examples of the latter studied in this paper, are the differential tax treatment of 
irregular income, the second earner's income, and wage earnings as opposed to 
other income sources. 
3. We highlight a fundamental difficulty in all methods, including ours, that 
rely on the partition by similars for the measurement of HI. Consider the ideal 
partition of exact equals in adjusted income space. The pre-tax inequality within 
each subgroup in this partition is zero. Therefore, the application of a progressive 
tax schedule to unadjusted incomes gives rise to HI which contributes negatively 
to the RE. However, in the real world the pre-tax inequality within each subgroup 
in the partition of similars is, hopefully small, but greater than zero. As we will see 
below, in the case in which a small or no adjustment is made for tax unit size, the 
application of the tax schedule may very well lead to a measure of HI which 
contributes positively to the RE. These complications can only be studied if one 
isolates the impact of the tax schedule from the other elements of the system and, 
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simultaneously, one considers different values for the parameter which defines the 
generosity of the equivalence scale. This double condition is not fulfilled by any of 
the previous studies we know of. 
The Instituto de Estudios Fiscales in Spain has been collecting a panel of about 
200,000 income tax returns for the period 1982 to 1990. This has made possible a 
number of microeconomic studies6 on the distributional impact of the Spanish 
IRPF. Previous work on the IRPF has led to the following stylized facts: 
(i) From 1982 to 1990, the RE has been consistently increasing. The explanation 
is to be found in an increase of the mean of the pre-tax distribution in money and 
real terms, an increase over time in the inequality of that distribution, and to a 
smaller extent, in the changes introduced in the tax system during this period.7 
(ii) However measured, the HI has been of a small order of magnitude. As far as 
the trend is concerned, it has been declining over time, except for an unexpected 
increase in 1988, the year in which the separate returns system was first introduced.8 
In this chapter we work with a random sample of more than 10,000 tax returns 
for 1986 and 1988, representative of the Institute's panel. We study two types of 
empirical questions. On the'one hand, we confirm previous findings for the RE and 
the HI of the system as a whole. In our framework, it is immediate to obtain also 
estimates for the overall SWC. 
On the other hand, we concentrate on the structure of the IRPF at two levels of 
desaggregation. First, we break down the system into two blocks: the application 
of the tax schedule on pre-tax income (after the correction for the favourable 
treatment of irregular income), and the rest of the exemptions and tax credits taken 
as a whole. The main finding is that the second block contributes negatively to the 
RE but positively to the SWC. 
Secondly, we estimate the fundamental concepts in this chapter—the RE, the 
REVE, the SWC, as well as the decomposition of the RE into HI and VR compo-
nents—for each of six different stages. The first two are the application of the tax 
schedule to pre-tax unadjusted income, and the correction introduced by family tax 
credits. The next three deal with the fiscal authority's attempts to avoid horizontal 
inequities arising from tax unit characteristics absent in the definition of adjusted 
income. These are the treatment of irregular income, the second earner's income, 
and wage earnings. Stage six includes all other exemptions and tax credits justified 
by other than equity reasons. Among other things, this breakdown allows us a more 
detailed explanation than previous studies of the increase in the ///between 1986 
and 1988. 
The rest of the chapter is organized in five sections and an Appendix. Section II 
lays down the welfare comparisons between tax units of different size, the social 
evaluation procedure, and the distinction between horizontal and vertical inequities. 
Section III contains a description of the IRPF and an exposition of which concepts 
might be signed a priori at each of the six separate stages. Section IV is devoted to 
the empirical results. Section V focuses on unintended HI. Section VI presents a 
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summary of results and some concluding remarks. The Appendix describes in detail 
how the data was organized into the six stages. 
II. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK9 
A. Welfare Comparisons between Heterogeneous Tax Units 
Assume we have a heterogeneous population of i = 1, . . . , N tax units, which 
may differ in their pre-tax income x' and/or a number of non-income characteristics. 
In addition to a person known as the taxpayer, tax units may include a spouse and/or 
a number of dependents. In this chapter the only ethically relevant characteristic is 
tax unit size, denoted by s'. Original incomes x' andx7 are non comparable unless 
s' = s7. Otherwise, one can define adjusted or equivalent income in the absolute case 
as 
the income we can subtract from a tax unit of size s' for a reference taxpayer to 
enjoy the same utility level with the remaining income. The parameter X indicates 
the importance we are willing to give to the economies of scale in consumption 
within the tax unit; the greater is X, the smaller are the economies of scale. 
Letx*denote the vector of incomes for units of size k= 1 , . . . ,K, and let A{.) be 
any index of absolute inequality. Then for any A:, 
where the parameter can be interpreted as the cost of a person, so that (s' - ]) is 
that is, adjusted income inequality within each ethically homogeneous subgroup of 
identical tax units, is equal to original income inequality. In other words, the 
adjustment procedure does not alter the inequality within homogeneous subgroups. 
People live grouped in families and/or households, but we only have information 
on incomes and characteristics at the tax unit level. Since a family or a household 
may consist of more than one tax unit, economies of scale at family or household 
level are probably larger than at tax unit level. This makes any attempt to establish 
individual welfare comparisons even harder than usual. Therefore, we take as our 
object of study the unweighted distribution of tax unit adjusted income. 
B. Social Welfare Functions 
A social welfare function is a real valued function <t> defined in the space R of 
adjusted incomes, with the interpretation that for each income distribution, say 
r = ( r 1 , . . . , r"), <£>(r) provides the aggregate welfare from a normative point of 
view. For any income distribution r and any social welfare function d>, let x(r) be 
the equally-distributed-equivalent income (EDEI) defined by 
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For any partition of the population, we are interested in welfare measures capable 
of distinguishing—in a convenient additive way—between two components: wel-
fare within the subgroups, weighted by demographic shares, and the loss of welfare 
due to the inequality between the subgroups. Without loss of generality, let us 
choose the partition by tax unit size into k - 1 , . . . ,K subgroups. Blackorby and 
associates (1981) define between-group inequality as the inequality that would 
result if each household received her subgroup's EDEI, E(rk). These authors 
establish that, combined with the usual assumptions on social welfare functions,'0 
the separability conditions required to estimate the EDEI of any subgroup in any 
partition independently of the rest of the distribution lead in the absolute case to 
the Kolm-Pollak family: 
where y is interpreted as an aversion to inequality parameter: as y increases, the 
social indifference curves show increasing curvature until only the income of the 
poorest person matters. 
Let A A.) be the index of absolute inequality consistent with Oy defined by 
It can be shown that 
where u.(.) is the mean of the distribution. On the other hand, since 
we have that 
where 
This is an appealing decomposition, in which social welfare is seen to be equal to 
the weighted average of the welfare within each of the subgroups, with weights 
equal to population shares, less the inequality between the subgroups. 
Recall that, in our definition of adjusted income, we have parametrized as follows 
the weight we give to economies of scale in consumption: r'(k) =r - X(s' - 1). 
Thus, social welfare of adjusted income distribution r(X) is equal to 
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is the pure vertical effect induced by the IRPF. As Lambert and Ramos (1996) point 
out, it is as if horizontally, the tax acts to increase the inequality where there was 
little before—within each group of pre-tax similars in adjusted income space—and 
vertically, it acts to reduce inequality between such groups. Because the expression 
HI(k, y) = RE(X, y) — VR(X, y) is expected to be negative, Lambert and Ramos 
indicate that horizontal inequality gets measured as a loss of vertical performance. 
III. A DESCRIPTION OF THE IRPF 
A. Basic Features 
The key elements of the system which need to be described are the following 
four: (i) the notion of pre-tax income (rendimiento neto); the taxable income {base 
imponible), which is equal to pre-tax income less allowable exemptions; (iii) the 
tax schedule, which taxes differently regular as opposed to irregular income; and 
(iv) a number of tax credits to be deducted from the gross tax (cuota Integra) to 
reach tax liability (cuota liquida). After-tax income is equal to pre-tax income less 
tax liability. 
(i) Pre-tax income consists of regular plus irregular income. Regular income is 
equal to wage or salary income, less mandatory contributions to the public Social 
Security system, plus income—net of necessary expenditures—from en-
trepreneurial, professional or agrarian activities, capital income, and imputed 
income from owner-occupied housing.'3 Most people receive a regular income flow 
of this type per unit of time, where the unit of time is the fiscal year. However, some 
people may collect discontinously income amounts that have been earned during a 
period of time longer than one fiscal year. Together with this component, irregular 
income includes realized capital gains less compensation from patrimonial losses 
in present and previous years. 
(ii) Taxable income is equal to pre-tax income less unemployment compensation 
and a proportional deduction from wage income. Unemployment compensation is 
exempted by virtue of a Supreme Court sentence. Of course this exemption creates 
and similarly for the post-tax distribution v(X). Therefore, 
where the expression 
measures the HI for the population as a whole, while the expression 
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HI which, as in previous studies, cannot be measured in this chapter. Non-wage 
earners are allowed deductions on account of expenditures necessary to earn their 
income. Because it is harder for wage earners to justify expenditures of this sort, a 
2 percent deduction is allowed for them. On our part, we have included this 
deduction as part of the favorable treatment of wage earners in the fifth stage of the 
analysis described below and in the Appendix. Finally, in 1988 contributions to 
private pension funds up to a certain limit are also exempted. 
(iii) In both years, the tax schedule for regular income is progressive in the sense 
that average and absolute tax rates are increasing functions of income. Marginal 
tax rates are less than one, so that there can be no rerankings from the application 
of the schedule. In 1986 there is no minimum exempted income, and tax rates start 
at 8 percent up to an income equal to 500,000 pesetas. In 1988, incomes below 
600,000 pesetas are tax exempted, and average and marginal rates change consid-
erably relative to 1986. In both years, irregular income is divided into two parts: 
an annualized component, and the rest of irregular income. The first component is 
taxed as regular income, while the second is taxed at a smaller rate. The gross tax 
is the consequence of applying the tax schedule to regular and irregular taxable 
income. 
(iv) Tax liability is equal to the gross tax less a number of tax credits. We 
distinguish between two classes. The first class consists of tax credits granted by 
the fiscal authority to avoid horizontal inequities in three different situations. The 
first two situations are common to both years: a tax credit for dependents,14 equal 
to a fixed deduction for each dependent of a given type, and an additional 
compensation to wage earners, this time in the form of a fixed tax credit. The third 
and more complex case, differs considerably between the two years. 
The 1986 IRPF is a family tax: all tax units have to fill in a joint return, and 
pre-tax income is equal to income from all sources accruing to all family members. 
In exchange for this, the following tax credits are allowed: a fixed allowance for 
every taxpayer, a second allowance if a spouse is present, a third allowance 
depending on the number of earners, and a variable deduction depending on the 
income of the first two earners. The variable deduction recognizes that an income 
vector (90, 10) should not be taxed as an income vector (50, 50), nor as an income 
of 100 units accruing a tax unit consisting of a single taxpayer. To avoid discrimi-
nation against married individuals a tax credit is granted to the first two tax units 
in the example, with the first one receiving a greater tax break than the second. 
In 1988, the main difference is the introduction of the possibility of filling in 
separate returns. Tax units with a spouse but a single earner are allowed a fixed 
deduction as before. Tax units with two earners are allowed to fill in either a joint 
return, or two separate returns. In the first case, they are given a tax credit equal to 
the maximum of the fixed deduction or a variable deduction depending again on 
the vector of incomes. Those choosing separate returns, have their incomes taxed 
separately with no deductions whatsoever. However, to ensure comparability 
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between the two tax regimes, in the empirical analysis separated tax returns are 
combined to produce a single observation for each family. 
Tax credits in the second class are those justified on grounds unrelated to 
horizontal equity considerations. This class includes tax breaks linked to current 
expenditures on health, the acquisition of the primary and secondary residential 
housing, and other types of saving through the acquisition of life insurance or other 
financial assets either privately or publicly issued, and a large number of minor 
items which is not necessary to list here.15 
B. The Six Stages of the Analysis 
For the purpose of this chapter, the above elements are reorganized in six 
consecutive stages. (See the Appendix for details on the use of the data for this 
purpose.) We begin with the application of the tax schedule to total pre-tax family 
income, treated entirely as regular income. Then, we consider the correction for 
demographic characteristics taken into account in the definition of adjusted income: 
the presence of dependents of various types and/or a spouse, whether an income 
earner or not. The next three stages are reserved for the favorable treatment of tax 
unit characteristics absent in the analyst's equivalence scale. These are, respec-
tively, the presence of irregular income, the second earner's income, and wage 
earnings. Finally, the sixth stage isolates the impact of the remaining tax credits.16 
To simplify notation, let us omit the parameters y and X capturing, respectively, 
the aversion to absolute inequality and the generosity of the equivalence scale as a 
function of tax unit size. Then, for each stage j = 1, . . . , 6, let us denote by 
RE., REVE-, SWCj, HI., and VR, the central concepts of this study: the redistributive 
effect, the revenue effect and the social welfare change, where 
and the horizontal and the vertical contribution to the redistributive effect: 
The question is: what can be said a priori about the sign and relative magnitude of 
these concepts at each stage and for the IRPF as a whole? 
Stage 7. The Tax Schedule 
Let zl'(X) denote the adjusted income of tax unit i after the gross tax on pre-tax 
family income, GT(x'): 
where x'(X) = x' - X(s' - 1). Then stage 1 takesusfromx(l) = (x'(A.),..., A^(A,))to 
zl(k) = (zl l(k),..., z\N(k)). The expression for social change is: 
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Notice that if we could work with exact equals, then A(xe(X)) = 0 for all e, so that 
HIX(X) < 0 for all values of A. with 7/7,(0) = 0. This is the HI due to the fact that the 
tax schedule is being applied to unadjusted income, while the evaluation procedure 
considers the partition by exact equals in adjusted income space. However, the most 
we can hope for is to construct a partition of similars in x(X) space. Whatever the 
means used to accomplish this task, to which we will return in the empirical part, 
we have that A(xe(X)) > 0 for all e. Therefore, our estimate of 777 provides un upper 
bound for the 777 in the partition by exact equals. In particular, think of the polar 
case in which X = 0. Then, because of the progressivity of the tariff, we have that 
A(xe(0)) > A(zle(0)) for all e, and therefore 777, (0) > 0. Of course, this quantity does 
not reflect a type of 777 we want to do away with. It simply captures the effect of a 
progressive tariff within similars in unadjusted income space. However, for X 
sufficiently large, it may very well be the case that A{xe(X)) < A{z\e{X)) for some e, 
so that 777, (A,) becomes negative. 
On the other hand, the expression VR{(X) measures the pure vertical effect 
induced by the tax schedule. Because of the progressivity of the tax schedule, we 
expect VR^X) > 0 and large17 for all X, and hence, RE^X) > 0. However, REVE] 
should be large also, but of the opposite sign, so that nothing can be said a priori 
about the sign of SWCV 
Stage 2. Demographic Deductions 
Tax units with several members will typically have larger pre-tax family income, 
but also greater needs. Thus, exactly for the same reasons that the income distribu-
tion analyst considers tax unit size in the definition of adjusted income, the fiscal 
where 
and 
where 
and 
On the other hand, by applying the additive separability property of the Kolm-
Pollak index of absolute inequality to the partition of similars e = 1, . . . , E, we 
have that 
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authority compensates tax units for the costs incurred by a spouse and/or dependents 
of different types. The term HI2(X) measures the ///created by family deductions 
aimed to compensate for the fact that the tax schedule applies to unadjusted income. 
Thus, for large enough X, we expect HI2(X) > 0. However, the term VR2(k) cannot 
be signed a priori. Correspondingly, RE2(X) is also unsigned. Therefore, in spite of 
the fact that REVE2 is positive, SWC2 cannot be signed either. 
Stage 3. The Correction for Irregular Incomes 
As we have seen, the fiscal authority applies a lower tax rate to some part of 
irregular income, in order to avoid horizontal inequities between tax units with the 
same pre-tax income but a different composition in terms of regular and irregular 
components. However, since irregular incomes are received mostly by the rich, we 
expect the VR^X) component to be negative for all X. On the other hand, in some 
subgroup of similars some units may have irregular incomes and some not. Thus, 
the favorable treatment of irregular income (which tries to avoid the excess of 
progressivity on individuals getting life-time incomes in a non regular way) leads 
to an increase in absolute inequality within these subgroups, and hence to a negative 
HIjiX) component. Therefore, the corresponding RE^'X) is expected to be negative. 
Of course, as in every stage except the first one, REVE3 is positive; therefore 
SWC3(X) is unsigned a priori. 
Stages 4 and 5. The Treatment of the Second Earner's Income and of 
Wage Income 
Notice that nothing can be said a priori about the sign of REXX) or VRIX) for 
any j = 4, 5. This simply reflects the fact that whether these types of deductions 
generates a progressive or a regressive impact is an empirical question. Nothing 
can be said either about the sign of HI&X) in either case. As a matter of fact, the 
sign and magnitude of HI4 after the introduction of the separate returns system in 
1988, is one of the issues that has attracted more attention in recent research about 
the Spanish IRPF. 
Stage 6. Deductions Not Justified on Equity Grounds 
In the sixth place, we have the tax credits granted by the fiscal authority for other 
than equity reasons. However legitimate their respective justification from other 
points of view, all deductions in this class typically cause some a priori social 
concern because it is feared that they give rise to ethically unjustifiable 
HI^X) £ 0 and possibly negative. On the other hand, neither VR^X) nor RE^X) 
can be signed apriori, although it is expected that this type of tax break is ultimately 
regressive, that is, RE6(X) < 0. However, whether this may lead to a SWCh(X) < 0 
cannot be said a priori. 
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The IRPF as a Whole 
Because of the relative importance of the progressive tax schedule, we expect 
both VR(k) and RE(X) > 0 for all X. However, based on all previous investiga-
tions,18 we expect HI(X) < 0 but small. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. The Data 
Our data comes from a representative random sample of the panel of income tax 
returns collected by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. For comparability purposes, 
separate returns in 1988 have been aggregated into a single tax unit. The distribution 
of tax units with positive pre-tax income19 for 1986 and 1988 is in Table 1. Tax 
units have been classified by the type of return. We distinguish between individual 
returns, separate returns and, within joint returns, those who benefit only from fixed 
family tax credits, and those who benefit from the variable deduction depending 
on the incomes of the first two earners. 
In 1988 the number of new entrants in the panel is greater than the number of 
exits. In relative terms there are more individual and fewer joint returns. However, 
the demographic structure does not change much. As can be observed in Table 2, 
the proportion of small units tends to increase, while the proportion of tax units 
with 5 or more people tends to decrease. Consequently, from 1986 to 1988 mean 
tax unit size decreases from 3.02 to 2.89. On the other hand, the distribution by size 
within each type, remains rather stable during the period. Three quarters of tax units 
with a single taxpayer consists of a single individual, and the rest have at most 1 or 
2 dependents. Among tax units with at least two people and/or two earners, those 
receiving the fixed tax credits have a slightly greater average size and a larger share 
of dependents in 1986. In 1988, those filling separate returns are indistinguishable 
with those filling a joint return with fixed family tax credits. 
The evolution of pre-tax incomes is shown in Table 3 for several values of the 
parameter X. When we do not take into account tax unit size, that is, when X = 0, 
average money income increases by 24.5 percent from 1986 to 1988. Since the rate 
Table 1. Distr ibut ion of Tax Units in the Sample by Return Type 
Return Type 1986 % 1988 % 
Individual returns 3,046 27.7 3,757 31.2 
Joint returns 
Fixed family tax credits only 6,481 59.0 6,237 51.8 
Variable deduction 1,466 13.3 1,263 10.5 
Separate returns — — 773 6.4 
Total 10,993 100.0 12,030 100.0 
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Table 2. Distribution of Tax Units by Return Type and Tax Unit Size 
Tax Unit Size, 1986 
Return Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 or + Total Mean 
Individual returns 76.0 17.1 5.1 1.1 0.5 0.2 100.0 1.33 
Joint returns 
Fixed family tax credits — 21.2 24.4 31.8 13.8 8.8 100.0 3.70 
Variable deduction — 20.6 30.7 32.0 10.1 6.6 100.0 3.55 
Total 21.1 20.0 19.9 23.3 9.6 6.1 100.0 3.02 
Tax Unit Size, 1988 
Individual returns 75.1 18.0 5.0 1.4 0.4 0.1 100.0 1.35 
Joint returns 
Fixed family tax credits — 22.7 24.3 32.5 12.9 7.6 100.0 3.62 
Variable deduction — 21.2 30.0 34.7 9.8 4.3 100.0 3.48 
Separate returns — 24.3 28.7 24.8 12.8 9.4 100.0 3.61 
Total 23.4 21.2 19.2 22.5 8.6 5.1 100.0 2.89 
of inflation was 10 percent, there is a considerable growth in real terms of 14.5 
percent. However, tax revenues increased even more.20 Thus, as we can see in Table 
3, fiscal pressure defined as 
increases from 11.9 percent in 1986 to 13.2 in 1988, when X = 0. Of course, the 
greater is X, the greater is fiscal pressure in every year. 
The distribution of taxable income by income sources is presented in Table 4. 
Wage earnings represent close to 80 percent in both periods, although the share of 
most other sources increases slightly in 1988. In particular, the share of irregular 
income is considerably larger in 1988. 
B. The Influence of the Parameters Representing the Generosity of the 
Equivalence Scale (A.) and the Aversion to Inequality (y) 
We begin by choosing y = 2.2E^, and X = 90,000/120,000 for 1986/1988, 
respectively. Absolute inequality is not scale independent, but these two k values 
Table 3. The Evolution of Pre-tax Incomes and Fiscal Pressure 
7986 1988 
0 30,000 90,000 120,000 0 40,000 120,000 200,000 
1,431,745 1,371,051 1,249,665 1,188,972 1,782,861 1,707,074 1,555,500 1,403,925 
11 9 12 5 13.7 14.4 13 2 13.8 15.2 16.8 
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Table 4. Taxable Income by Income Sources 
Income Sources 1986 1988 
Wage earnings 79.7 773 
Entrepreneurial 8.4 9.3 
Professional 2.6 2.6 
Agrarian 1.8 1.8 
Capital income 5.0 5.8 
Imputed net housing rent 1.6 1 0 
Irregular income 0.9 2.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
represent, approximately, 15 percent of mean per capita pre-tax income in both 
years. Table 5 presents estimates of the mean, as well as the absolute inequality and 
welfare of the pre-tax and after-tax adjusted income distributions. These allow us 
to compute the first three fundamental concepts of this chapter: the RE, the REVE, 
and the SWC in each year. The decomposition of RE into HI and VR components 
is treated in a separate section. 
As expected, RE is positive in both years. Relative to the absolute inequality of 
pre-tax income, it represents an improvement of 28.6 and 26.9 percent in inequality 
in 1986 and 1988, respectively. However, REVE is larger than RE, so that SWC < 
Table 5. The Impact of the IRPF in the Central Case: 
y = 2.2E"6 and X = 90,000/120,000 in 1986/1988 
1986 1988 
1,249,665 1,555,500 
538,141 791,519 
711,524 763,981 
1,061,886 1,319,125 
384,332 578,748 
677,554 740,376 
153,809 212,771 
-187,779 -236,375 
-33,970 -23,604 
28.6 26.9 
-4 .8 -3.1 
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Table 6. The Impact on SWC and RE of Changing y and X 
X: 0 30,000 90,000 120,000 
y = 2 . 2 f 7 39.9 40.3 40.6 40.5 
y = 2 . 2 r 6 28.1 28.5 28.6 28.1 
7 = 1 F"5 18.7 18.8 16.9 
— 
Y = 2.2£~7 -10.5 -11.0 -12.2 -12.9 
y = 2.2f"6 -3 .9 -4.2 -4.8 -5.2 
y = 1 F 5 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 — 
Y = 2 .2F 7 39.5 39.9 40.2 39.9 
Y = 2 .2F 6 26.5 26.9 26.9 25.4 
y = 1 F 5 17.6 17.7 15.3 — 
y = 2 . 2 F 7 -9.6 -10.1 -11.2 -12.7 
Y = 2.2f"6 -2.5 -2.7 -3.1 -3.9 
y = 1 F 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 — 
X: 0 40,000 120,000 200,000 
y = 2.2E-7 39.5 39.9 40.2 39.9 
y = 2.2E~b 26.5 26.9 26.9 25.4 
y = 1 T 5 17.6 17.7 15.3 — 
7 = 2 . 2 f " 7 -9 .6 -10.1 -11.2 -12.7 
y = 2.2f-6 -2.5 -2.7 -3.1 -3.9 
y = i r 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 — 
0 in both years. This social welfare loss, prior to any benefit derived from the public 
expenditure and transfers made possible by the tax revenue, is of a small order of 
magnitude: between 3 and 5 percent as a percentage of pre-tax welfare. 
Table 6 presents the impact on RE and SWC of changes in y and X. Two comments 
are in order. In the first place, given y, the absolute inequality of adjusted income, 
A (x(X)), first decreases and then increases as a function of X. Beyond a certain 
point, absolute inequality becomes larger than mean income and social welfare 
becomes negative, a situation which presents problems of interpretation. This leads 
us to fix the upper bound of X at 120,000/200,000 pesetas in 1986/1988, respec-
tively. However, since the inequality of pre-tax and after-tax income follow the 
same non-linear pattern with X, the RE varies little with X. Since the REVE is 
independent of A., the same is the case for the SWC{X) = RE(X) + REVE. 
In the second place, given X, the greater the aversion to inequality parameter y, 
the greater is the improvement in inequality captured by the REV and the smaller 
the social welfare loss. As a matter of fact, when y = \E~ , there is no social welfare 
loss for most values of X. We must take into account that the greater the y, the greater 
is the inequality of pre-tax income and the smaller is social welfare.21 Thus, the 
ratios (RE /A (x)) and (SWCJO (x)) both decrease as y increases. 
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Given these results, we feel justified in concentrating our attention to the central 
case in which y = 2.2ET6, and A, = 90,000/120,000 for 1986/1988. 
C. The Tax Schedule Versus Exemptions and Tax Credits 
We begin with an overall view of the tax in both years. We reorganize the six 
stages into two main blocks: the operation of the tax schedule, including the 
treatment of irregular income, and the rest of exemptions and tax credits taken as 
a whole. The information is in Table 7. 
As expected, in both years the tax schedule contributes positively to the RE. 
However, in both years the exemptions and tax credits have a regressive effect on 
the RE, which amounts to a reduction of 23.5 and 26.9 percent in 1986 and 1988, 
respectively, of the RE attributable to the tax schedule.22 On the other hand, the 
exemptions and tax credits represent a 36.2 percent of the gross tax revenue 
collected in 1986, versus 33.2 percent in 1988. 
The RE of the tax schedule is smaller than its REVE, so that the SWC attributable 
to it is negative. This welfare loss is 13.1 percent and 8.2 percent of pre-tax welfare 
in 1986 and 1988, respectively. On the contrary, the increase in disposable income 
due to the exemptions and tax credits is greater than its negative contribution to the 
RE, so that they contribute positively to the overall SWC. As we know, the net SWC 
is negative, but of a small order of magnitude: 4.8 and 3.1 percent in 1986 and 1988, 
respectively. 
It would be tempting to use this analysis to draw definite conclusions about 
whether the legislative changes introduced in 1988 have caused the tax schedule, 
the exemptions and tax credits, or the IRPF as a whole to be more or less progressive 
Table 7. An Overall View of the Redistributive and 
Welfare Effects of the IRPF 
1986 J 988 
RE due to: 
1. The tax schedule 
2. Exemptions and tax credits 
Total Rf=1 +2 
RFVFdueto: 
3. The tax schedule 
4. Exemptions and tax credits 
Total REVE =3 +4 
SWC due to: 
5. The tax schedule = 1 + 3 
6. Exemptions and tax credits = 2 + 4 
Total SWC= 5 +6 
200,964 291,047 
^ 7 , 1 5 5 -78,276 
153,809 212,771 
•294,425 -353,493 
106,646 117,118 
•187,779 -236,375 
-93,461 -62,446 
59,491 
-33,970 
38,842 
-23,604 
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than in 1986. However, in order to do that we would have to take into account the 
impact of the exits and entries into the sample, as well as the role of the initial 
pre-tax distribution, distinguishing between the change in the unit of account and 
the change in real terms in both the mean and absolute inequality—a task left for 
further research.23 
D. The Different Stages of the IRPF 
Now is time to look at the different stages in some detail. In Table 8 we present 
the information for each of the six stages on the breakdown of the RE into a HI and 
a VR component, the REVE, and the SWC. There are two rows for each stage: the 
first is for the absolute amounts in pesetas; the second, in parenthesis, is for the 
expressions (HI/RE)100 and (VR/RE)100. 
It should be noted that, after some experimentation, the criterion to form the 
similars partition in adjusted income space has been the following. For each 
subgroup of similars e = 1,. . . ,E, we have fixed the absolute inequality A(xe(k)) 
less than or equal than 0.5 percent of the inequality for the population as a whole, 
A(x(X)). In this way, for example, for k = 90,000/120,000 in 1986/1988, the number 
of subgroups turned out to be E = 86/130 in a sample of 10,993/12,030 tax units. 
It would be best to treat one year at a time, starting with 1986. Each row in Table 
8 allows us to understand the sign of the RE attributable to each stage. (1) Notice 
that the application of the tax schedule leads to a small negative ///,, only 2.7 
percent of the corresponding REX, which is of course positive. The explanation for 
HI} < 0 is twofold: on the one hand, the tax schedule applies to unadjusted income 
but we evaluate the effect on adjusted income space for a sufficiently large k = 
90,000 pesetas. On the other hand, this value of k need not coincide with the implicit 
fiscal scale. (2) Family deductions are meant to correct the ///, created in step 1. 
This is exactly what we observe: HI2 is now positive. However, a large enough 
VR2 < 0 leads to a RE2 < 0. (3) When we correct for the treatment of irregular 
income, we find an important ///3 effect, greater than 50 percent of the correspond-
ing REy Notice that VR3 < 0, indicating a not surprising pro-rich bias in this stage. 
Hence, RE^ < 0. (4) The help granted by the IRPF to two-earner tax units creates a 
small HIA < 0 effect, 8.7 percent of the corresponding RE4. The fact that VR4 < 0, 
shows that these tax credits tend to favor the rich more than the poor. (5) Tax breaks 
to wage earners have two components in 1986: one is fixed, the other is proportional 
to wage income. The second component leads necessarily to an increase in absolute 
inequality. We actually observe a small HIS < 0 effect and a VR5 < 0, so that 
RE5 < 0. (6) Finally, deductions not justified on equity grounds give rise to negative 
HI6 and VR6 effects, as expected. 
The sum of all effects attributable to the various exemptions and tax credits, 
generate a negative HI as well as a negative VR, and hence a negative contribution 
to RE, as we saw before. This is exactly the same conclusion obtained by Camarero 
and associates (1993) in their study of all the tax returns for the province of Vizcaya 
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in 1989. Their grouping of deductions is somewhat different than ours, and they 
measure HI by applying a scale invariant measure of distributional change to the 
partition by similars in income adjusted space. These authors study the impact on 
HI of eliminating the different tax breaks, maintaining in each case the tax revenue 
constant. They find that only the elimination of family tax credits will increase HI. 
The elimination of all other tax breaks, including the important case of tax credits 
for two-earners tax units, will reduce the ///—the pattern described above.24 
Table 8. The Stages of the IRPF 
1986 
Stages HI VR RE REVE SWC 
1. Tax schedule -551 202,543 201,992 -296.064 -94,071 
(-0.3) (100.3) (100.0) 
2. Family tax credits 1,232 -6,639 -5,407 31,995 26,588 
(-22.8) (122.8) (100.0) 
3. Irregular income -598 -430 -1,028 1,638 610 
(58.2) (41.8) (100.0) 
4. Second earner's income -619 -6,528 -7,147 9,204 2,057 
(8.7) (91.3) (100.0) 
5. Wage earnings -284 -9,758 -10,043 23,313 13,271 
(2.8) (97.2) (100.0) 
6. Non-equity exemptions -2,087 -22,471 -24,557 42,133 17,575 
and tax credits (8.5) (91.5) (100.0) 
All -2,907 156,717 153,809 -187,779 -33,970 
(-1.9) (101.9) 
1988 
(100.0) 
Stages HI VR RE REVE SWC 
1. Tax schedule -1,505 298,373 296,868 -359,249 -62,381 
(-0.5) (100.5) (100.0) 
2. Family tax credits 1,957 -15,434 -13,477 35,082 21,605 
(-14.5) (114.5) (100.0) 
3. Irregular income -2,438 -3,38 -5,821 6,056 235 
(41.9) (58.1) (100.0) 
4. Second earner's income -3,421 -25,705 -29,126 31,791 2,664 
(11.7) (88.3) (100.0) 
5. Wage earnings -632 -15,997 -16,629 27,041 10,412 
(3.8) (96.2) (100.0) 
6. Non-equity exemptions -2,322 -16,721 -19,043 22,903 3,860 
and tax credits (12.2) (87.8) (100.0) 
All -8,361 221,132 212,771 -236,375 -23,604 
(-3.9) (103.9) (100.0) 
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The small negative HIX effect attributable to the tariff, is completely offset by the 
positive VRX, which leads to a REX > 0. On balance, there is an overall HI < 0, but 
of a small order of magnitude: 19 percent of the overall RE. The pattern by stages 
in 1988 is very similar. The main difference is that the overall HI represents now 
3.9 percent of the RE. For our two years, Lambert and Ramos (1996) results in the 
relative case are as follows: they estimate a negative ///contribution in both years, 
equal to 1.9 percent of the RE in 1986 and to 2.5 percent in 1988. 
These global results are in line with previous studies: 
(i) In Spain, like in other countries, HI is a small quantitative phenomenon 
however it is measured. Recall, however, that in the Spanish case two sources of 
HI could not be taken into account: unemployment compensation, exempted from 
taxable income, and fiscal evasion. 
(ii) As in Lambert and Ramos (1996) in the relative case, in the absolute case HI 
detracts from the improvement in vertical inequality which we expect from an 
income tax system. 
(iii) Like Pazos and associates (1994), and Lambert and Ramos (1996), we find 
that HI increases in 1988. Our detailed approach allows us to search for the cause 
of this increase. The relevant information is in column (1) of Table 9, which presents 
the percentage contribution of each stage to the overall HI. 
Table 9. The Stages of the IRPF. Percentage Distributions 
1986 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stages HI VR RE REVE swc 
1. Tax schedule 18.9 129.2 131.3 157.7 276.9 
2. Family tax credits -42.4 -4.2 -3.5 -17.0 -78.3 
3. Irregular income 20.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.9 -1.8 
4. Second earner's income 21.3 -4.1 -4.6 -4.9 -6 .0 
5. Wage earnings 9.8 -6.2 -6.5 -12.5 -39.1 
6. Non-equity exemptions 71.8 -14.4 -16.0 -22.4 -51.7 
and tax credits 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1988 (1) (2) (3) (4) IS) 
Stages III VR RE REVE SWC 
1. Tax schedule 18.0 134.9 139.5 152.0 264.3 
2. Family tax credits -23.4 -7.0 -6.3 -14.8 -91.5 
3. Irregular income 29.2 -1.5 -2.7 -2.6 -1 .0 
4. Second earner's income 40.9 -11.6 -13.7 -13.4 -11.3 
5. Wage earnings 7.5 -7.2 -7.8 -11.5 -44.1 
6. Non-equity exemptions 27.8 -7.6 -8.9 -9.7 -16.4 
and tax credits 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Pazos and associates (1994) attribute the change to the greater role of irregular 
incomes in 1988. We confirm the increased importance of this stage, which gains 
10 percentage points in our explanation of the overall HI. But there are other factors. 
In the first place, the increase in HI is achieved in spite of a lessening of the 
importance of tax breaks not justified on equity grounds. In the second place, we 
observe that fixed family tax credits have a smaller correcting role in 1988 than in 
1986. In the third place, the treatment of two-earner tax units is contributing very 
clearly to the increase in HI experienced in 1988. 
To conclude our analysis of the structure of the IRPF by stages, we turn to the 
VR, the RE, the REVE, and the SWC. Columns (2) to (5) in Table 9 provide the 
percentage contribution of each stage to the corresponding totals. Starting with 
1986, we observe that due to the small role of HI the percentage distribution of VR 
is essentially the same as the one for the RE. In agreement with a priori expectations, 
non-equity tax breaks have the greatest negative contribution to RE, followed by 
the favorable treatment of wage earners. As far as the REVE is concerned, non-equity 
tax breaks have also the greatest effect, followed by family tax credits and the policy 
measures related to wage earners. The net effect is that family tax credits and 
non-equity tax breaks, followed by the treatment of wage earners, have the greatest 
positive contributions to SWC. In 1988, the main difference is the increasing 
regressive role played by family tax credits and, above all, by the treatment of the 
second earner's income. On the contrary, the importance of non-equity tax breaks 
is reduced. 
V. UNINTENDED INEQUALITY 
As we said in the Introduction, there are several types of unintended HI. In the first 
place, there is the HI created because the tax schedule applies to unadjusted income 
while the evaluation is performed in terms of adjusted income. When the parameter 
X determining the extent of the economies of scale in consumption is sufficiently 
large, our discussion in Section IV.B leads us to expect that the HI will be negative. 
This is indeed the case when X = 90,000/120,000 in 1986/1988, respectively. 
However, one may ask: what is the discrepancy between such values and the 
equivalence scale implicitly defined by the fiscal rules? The fiscal scale depends 
on family composition, as well as on tax unit size. However, on average, the fiscal 
scale is 17,427/22,308 pesetas in 1986/1988, respectively, a value well below our 
central X's. We have evaluated the IRPF using precisely the fiscal equivalence scale 
for each tax unit. The results are in Table 10, which contains also the estimates for 
the central case, as well as for the polar cases X = 0 and X = 120,000/200,000 in 
1986 and 1988, respectively. 
We observe that for both X = 0 and the fiscal scale, the HI attributable to the tax 
schedule becomes positive, as we indicated in Section IV.B it would be the case for 
sufficiently low values of X. Notice that the HI attributable to family deductions 
changes signs also. In all cases, the net impact of the schedule corrected by family 
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Table 10. Horizontal Inequality as a Function of X 
Stages X: 
1. Tax schedule 
2. Family tax credits 
3. Irregular income 
4. Second earner's inc. 
5. Wage earnings 
6. Non-equity items 
HI 
HI/RE in % 
g Stages X: 
o 
1. Tax schedule 
2. Family tax credits 
3. Irregular income 
4. Second earner's inc. 
5. Wage income 
6. Non-equity items 
HI 
HI/RE in % 
0 
2,337 -91.1 
-657 25.6 
-670 26.1 
-824 32.1 
-300 11.7 
-2,452 95.6 
-2,566 100.0 
1.68 
0 
2,248 -26.0 
-9,216 10.6 
-2,269 26.2 
-4,800 55.5 
-82 9.5 
-2,089 24  
-8,653 100.0 
4.09 
7986 
Fiscal Scale 
1,724 -63.7 
-324 12.0 
-657 24.3 
-761 28.1 
-269 9.9 
•2,420 89.5 
-2,704 100.0 
1.77 
1988 
Fiscal Scale 
1,038 -11.6 
-346 3.9 
-2,276 25.5 
^ , 7 4 2 53.1 
-717 8.0 
-1,888 21.1 
-8,931 100.0 
4.25 
90,000 
-551 18.9 
1,232 -42.4 
-598 20.6 
-619 21.3 
-284 9.8 
•2,087 71.8 
2,908 100.0 
1.89 
120,000 
-1,505 18.0 
1,957 -23.4 
-2,438 29.2 
-3,421 40.9 
-632 7.5 
-2,322 27.8 
-8,361 100.0 
3.93 
120,000 
-923 33.8 
1,653 -60.6 
-659 24.2 
-518 19.0 
-206 7.5 
-2,073 76.0 
-2,727 100.0 
1.77 
200,000 
-4,676 54.0 
3,038 -35.1 
-2,362 27.3 
-2,533 29.3 
-295 3.4 
-1,825 21.1 
-8,653 100.0 
4.04 
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tax credits contributes positively to the RE. This reflects the fact that, because we 
work with similars rather than exact equals, part of the impact of a progressive tariff 
is transmitted to the HI component of RE, rather than only to the VR component as 
it would have been desirable. 
In the second place, the HI attributable to the correction for irregular income is 
obviously unintended by the fiscal authority. It seems reasonable that irregular 
components of income are taxed at a lower rate. Notice, however, that it is mainly 
the rich who benefit from this treatment. 
In the third place, there is no reason in income distribution theory for treating 
wage earnings any different than other income sources. However, in a country 
where the evasion of non-wage earnings is known to be large, there seems to be 
reasons to grant wage earnings a favorable treatment. 
Finally, let us consider the treatment of the second earner's income. Again, in 
income distribution theory one simply adds up income from all sources and all 
family members to arrive at the family total. However, the fiscal authority takes 
into account that, because the tax schedule is progressive, the gross tax of the sum 
is greater than the sum of the gross taxes of the parts. In both 1986 and 1988 in 
Spain, a variable deduction is granted to tax units with two earners. In addition, in 
1988 the possibility of filling in separate returns is introduced. 
Apparently, the fiscal authority reformed the variable deduction in 1988 with the 
aim of partially offsetting the consequences of the introduction of the separate 
returns system which it was feared would help mostly the rich. As we see in Table 
10, tax credits in this stage are clearly regressive in both years, but much more so 
in 1988. 
One could ask: does this new system contribute negatively to HI, VR and, 
therefore, to the RE? We have attempted to answer this question by estimating these 
effects in a situation in which the tax units which had decided to fill in separate 
returns are forced to make a joint return, benefiting of course from the correspond-
ing variable deduction. The results are in Table 11. 
Table 11. The Effects of the Separate Returns System and the Variable 
Deduction in 1988 on HI, VR, and RE 
Effects attributable to: 
Variable 
Deduction and Variable Separate Returns 
Separate Returns Deduction Only Only 
1. H/4 = horizontal effect -3,422 -2,519 -903 
2. VR4 = vertical redistribution -25,705 -21,819 -3,886 
RE4=HI4 + VR4 = redistributive effect -29,127 -24,338 -4,789 
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The conclusion is that both the new separate returns system and the variable 
deduction contribute to a negative HI4, a negative VRA, and hence to a negative 
RE4. However, the issue is not completely settled. After all, the goal when intro-
ducing the possibility of separate returns was to improve HI among individual 
earners, not among tax units as defined in this and previous studies, where separate 
returns are added up in order to make possible the comparison with the results of 
the previous system.25 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have presented a social welfare model for the evaluation of the 
Spanish IRPF in 1986 and 1988. In these two years, the tax schedule was subject 
to important changes. In addition, in 1988 income earners of the same family were 
allowed the possibility of filling in separate returns. 
The redistributive effect (RE), capturing the improvement in inequality, and the 
revenue effect (REVE), capturing the loss in mean disposable income as a conse-
quence of the tax, are combined to produce a measure of social welfare change 
(SWC). Then, following Lambert and Ramos (1996) the RE is decomposed into a 
horizontal and a vertical contribution (HI and VR, respectively). 
The IRPF implicitly adopts an absolute equivalence scale, depending on the 
demographic characteristics usually employed in income distribution theory to 
adjust income for non-income needs. In order to evaluate the tax system from a 
comparable standpoint, we adopt also an absolute framework which is seldom used 
in the empirical literature. In the absolute case, the class of social welfare functions 
which satisfies a number of desirable properties—including the additive separabil-
ity condition necessary to implement the Lambert and Ramos approach to the 
measurement of HI—collapses into the Kolm-Pollak family of social welfare 
functions whose members are identified by an aversion to inequality parameter. 
Moreover, the SWC is seen to be equal to the RE plus the REVE, a convenient 
simplification. 
The main global findings of the chapter are the following. 
1. Let us separate the IRPF into two blocks, one consisting of the tax schedule 
on pre-tax income (after correcting for the treatment of irregular income), and 
another consisting of the rest of exemptions and all the tax credits. We find that in 
both years the second block contributes negatively to the RE. However, this is offset 
by the impact of the progressive tax schedule. Therefore, as documented in previous 
studies in a relative framework, we confirm that in both years there is a sizable RE 
> 0 for the IRPF as a whole. 
2. The exemptions and tax credits represent about a third of the gross tax 
revenue collected in both years. This increase in disposable income is greater than 
its negative contribution to the RE, so that this block of measures generates a welfare 
gain. On the contrary, the negative REVE of the tax schedule offsets its positive RE, 
generating a welfare loss. We find that, prior to the public expenditure and transfers 
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made possible by the REVE, the system as a whole gives rise to a welfare loss of 
about 5/3 percent of pre-tax welfare in 1986/1988, respectively. 
3. As in previous studies in Spain and other countries in a relative framework, 
we find that the HI of the IRPF is quantitatively small, of about 2/4 percent of the 
RE in each year. However, we confirm that the horizontal inequities detracts from 
the improvement in vertical inequality. 
Perhaps the more interesting results are obtained when we break down the IRPF 
into separate stages. This lead us to the following conclusions: 
4. In 1986, the more important component of the HI is attributable to the 
exemptions and tax credits unjustifiable on equity grounds. This is no longer the 
case in 1988, a year in which the overall HI is twice as large. The new treatment of 
the second earner's income after the change in the law, appears now as the more 
important cause of the HI. 
5. If the tax schedule is applied to pre-tax unadjusted income and the evaluation 
exercise proceeds in terms of adjusted income, then there must appear///whenever 
the economies of scale in consumption are assumed small enough. Such (unin-
tended) HI is meant to be corrected by family tax credits which recognize that larger 
tax units have greater needs. When the cost of a tax unit reference member is 
assumed to be equal to 90,000/120,000 pesetas, or about 15 percent of meander 
capita income in each year, this is exactly what we observe. 
6. The cost of a reference member implicit in the fiscal equivalence scale is 
much smaller than the above figures, about 17,500/22,000 pesetas on average in 
1986/1988, respectively. When we evaluate the system assuming the fiscal equiva-
lence scale, the tax schedule creates a positive HI and the family tax credits create 
a negative HI. This is seen to be the consequence of a fundamental shortcoming of 
all procedures relying on the notion of similars rather that exact equals in adjusted 
income space. A progressive tax schedule reduces the absolute inequality both 
between subgroups of similars, captured by a positive VR, and within each subgroup 
of similars, giving rise also to a positive HI. When economies of scale are assumed 
to be very important (or the cost of a reference member is assumed to be very small), 
this effect weighs more than the effect referred to in point 6 above. 
7. The fiscal authority grants exemptions and tax credits to avoid certain 
horizontal inequities which are not recognized in the equivalence scale used to 
define adjusted income. Therefore, these policy measures lead to (unintended) HI. 
In this chapter we have analyzed the following three cases: the favorable treatment 
of irregular income, the second earner's income, and wage earnings as opposed to 
other income sources. All of them generate negative HI and VR contributions, and 
hence a negative RE. 
It should be emphasized that the global results on the RE, its breakdown into HI 
and VR contributions, and the SWC of the IRPF are little affected by different 
assumptions about the generosity of the equivalence scale. On the other hand, the 
greater the aversion to absolute inequality, the greater is the improvement in 
inequality captured by the RE, and the smaller the social welfare loss. 
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The above results are as good as the random samples of 10,993/12,030 tax units 
in 1986/1988 provided by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales for this study. These 
are representative samples of the Institute's panel, consisting of approximately 
200,000 tax returns. Perhaps the worse shortcoming of this chapter is the lack of 
statistical properties of our estimates. Future research should also take into account 
the following points: 
(i) To establish intertemporal comparisons between 1986 and 1988, appropriate 
care must be taken of the differences in the unit of account in an absolute framework 
in which measurement instruments are not scale independent. This is in addition to 
the differences between the pre-tax income distributions expressed in real terms, 
and the role of exits and entries into the panel between these two years. 
(ii) Previous studies have found that, in the relative case, the increase in HI in 
1988 is a once and for all phenomenon. This should be investigated in an absolute 
framework. Furthermore, to determine the role of the introduction of the possibility 
of filling in separate returns as a cause of///before and after 1988, one should take 
into account that the Supreme Court ordered a change of the system in order to 
avoid horizontal inequities among individual income earners. This suggests a study 
of the distribution of individual tax returns, rather than the distribution in which 
couples filling in separate returns after 1988 are treated as a single tax unit. 
(iii) There are a number of normative exercises worth pursuing. The first is the 
study of a tax system which applies the IRPFXsx schedule to income adjusted by 
family circumstances, rather than to unadjusted income plus a set of family tax 
credits. The second exercise, is the study of simpler tax systems which trade off 
flatter tax rates for fewer exemptions and tax credits. 
APPENDIX 
Let us denote pre-tax family income for tax unit i by x'. It consists of regular plus 
irregular income. Regular income is equal to wage or salary income, W, plus 
income from other regular sources, O1, less expenditures necessary for the obtention 
of such income, EXP'. If we denote irregular income by IRR', then we have 
Taxable income,y, is equal to pre-tax income less a proportional deduction from 
wage income, rW, where r = 0.02 during the two years under study. In addition, 
in 1988 contributions to private pension funds, PEN1, are also exempted. Therefore, 
we have: 
Let us denote by P(.) the tax schedule on regular income. In both years, whenever 
irregular income is positive IRR' is divided in two parts: an annualized component, 
ANNUAL', and the rest of irregular income, REST'. The first component is taxed as 
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regular income, while the second component is taxed at a smaller rate P*(.). 
Therefore, the gross tax on regular and irregular taxable income, GT, is defined by: 
       
Tax liability, V, is equal to the gross tax less a number of tax credits which differ 
considerably during the two periods. In 1986, we distinguish between four tax 
credits. In the first place, there s    for dependents, DEP', equal to a fixed 
deduction ah for each dependent of type h. Thus, if d\ is the number of dependents 
of type h in tax unit i, we e 
   
In the second place, the following tax credits are allowed: a fixed allowance for 
every taxpayer, GEN, a fixed allowance if a spouse is present, COUPLE; a second 
allowance depending on the number of earners, NEARN', and a variable deduction, 
V(x\,x2)  depending on the vecto  of incomes of the  two  earners, 
x\ andx^. In the third place, there is a fixed tax credit for wage earners, WTC. 
Finally, let OTC denote all other tax credits not justified on equity grounds. 
Therefore, in 1986 tax liability is defined by: 
                  
In 1988, the main difference is that the possibility of separate returns is intro-
duced, while the allowances GEN and NEARN1 are eliminated. Tax units with a 
spouse but a single earner are allowed a fixed deduction COUPLE as before, so 
that 
           
Tax units with two earners are allowed to fill in either a joint return, or two separate 
returns. In the first case, they are given a tax credit equal to the maximum of 
COUPLE or a variable deduction V(x\,x'2) depending again on the vector of 
incomes x\ and x'2. Therefore, we have 
             
Those choosing separate returns, had their incomes taxed separately but loose their 
right to COUPLE or V(x\,x2). Therefore, we have 
           
Of course, both in 1986 and 1988, after-tax income, v', is equal to pre-tax income 
less tax liability: 
 
i a tax credit
hav
'2), depending on t e t r f i   first wage
, il  t  ll      li i t .  it  it   
 t  i l  r r r  ll   fi  ti    f r ,  
t t 
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The Six Stages of the Analysis 
In this chapter, we view the IRPF as consisting of six stages. Let us denote by 
z\'(X) the adjusted income after the tax schedule P(.) has been applied on pre-tax 
f n m i l v i n n n m p Tha t i c 
The first stage takes us from x(k) = (x](X),... ,xA'(X)) to z\(X) = 
(zl\X),...,z\N(X)). 
For tax units receiving irregular income, P(x') would overestimate the tax due. 
Unfortunately, we have detailed information on the irregular income sources which 
may give rise to ANNUAL' > 0, but we can only estimate if REST is different from 
0 due to other sources. Therefore, we cannot compute P*(REST'). Our solution is 
to approximate the excess tax by P(y) - GT(y'). If z2' denotes the income after the 
differential treatment of irregular income, then we have 
The second stage takes us fromzl(^.) toz2(X) = (z2](X),..., z2N(X)).26 
In the third place, the tax authority compensates tax units for the costs incurred 
by a spouse and/or dependents of different types. If we let z3' be the income after 
the family tax credits, that is, 
then the third stage takes us from z2(X) to z3(X) = (z3 \X),..., z3N(X)). 
Inthefourthplace,theIRPFtreatsdifferentlytheincomeearnedbythefirstor 
thesecond earner in the taxunit.Ifwe let ,SCX)bethecompensationtotaxunit/ on 
these grounds,then wehave, in 1986: 
in 1988, joint returns: 
andin 1988,separatereturns: 
Let z4' be the income after this stage, that is, 
In this notation, the fourth stage takes us from z3(X) toz4(X) = 
(z4\X),...,zAN(X)). 
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The sixth stage takes us from z5(X) to v(X) = (v\X), • • •, v^(X)). Taking into ac-
count that P(x) = P(y - rWi - PEN1), it is easy to check that v>(k) = x"(k) - t. 
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NOTES 
1. Of course, this is before taking into account the impact on people's welfare of public expenditures 
and transfers made possible by the income tax revenues, an aspect which is beyond this chapter's scope. 
2. This difficulty leads many authors to identify the maintenance of horizontal equity with the 
preservation of the ranking in the pre-tax distribution. See, for instance, Feldstein (1976), Atkinson 
(1980), Plotnick (1982, 1985), and King (1983). 
3. For other authors using the notion of similars see, for instance, Berliant and Strauss (1985), 
Camarero and associates (1993), Aronson and associates (1994), and Pazos and associates (1994). 
4. See Kolm (1976a, 1976b) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1980). 
5. For other applications of this methodology, see Ruiz-Castillo (1995a, 1996) and, in an income 
tax context, Aronson and associates (1994). 
6. See Castaner (1991 a, 1991 b), Jimenez and Salas (1991), Salas and Perez-Villacastin (1992), 
Lasheras and associates (1994), Pazos and associates (1994), Vargas (1995), and Lambert and Ramos 
(1996). 
7. See Castaner (1991a), Jimenez and Salas (1991), Salas and Perez-Villacastin (1992), and 
Lasheras and associates (1994). 
8. See Camarero and associates (1993), Pazos and associates (1994), and Lambert and Ramos (1996). 
9. For a detailed treatment of these issues, including the extension to the relative case, see 
Ruiz-Castillo (1995b). 
the fifth stage takes us from z4(k) to z5(A.) = (z5' (k),..., z5N(X)). 
Finally, there are all other tax credits, OTC, granted by the fiscal authority for 
other than equity reasons. Then we have that after-tax adjusted income V(k) should 
be equal to: 
In the fifth place, let z5' be the income after correcting the tax bill for the favorable 
treatment of wage income; that is, 
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10. Namely, continuity, S-concavity, monotonicity along rays parallel to the line of equality, and 
population replication invariance. 
11. For this approach see, for instance, Plotnick (1981) and King (1983). Jenkins (1994) contains 
a useful review and extensions of previous results. 
12. In this we differ from those who use the indices of distributional change studied by Cowell 
(1980, 1985). Jenkins (1988) applies them to the unadjusted income in the ethically relevant partition, 
while Camarero and associates (1993) and Pazos and associates (1994) apply them to the partition by 
similars in unadjusted and adjusted income. 
13. This last income source is measured as 3 or 2 percent, in 1986 and 1988, respectively, of the 
value of the housing stock, less mortgage interest. 
14. Dependents are children under 18 years old, minors between 18 and 15 years old with earnings 
below a certain amount, handicapped children without income, and parents with incomes below a certain 
limit. Since 1988, a fixed allowance for people over 70 years old is also granted. 
15. Whether some of these deductions can be given also a horizontal equity justification is, of 
course, a matter of opinion. However, we do not have microeconomic information to treat any of them 
outside of this residual group. 
16. We include in this stage the general tax credit to every taxpayer, granted only in 1986. Of course, 
this leaves the RE6 unchanged and affects the SWC6 only through its positive impact on the REVE6. 
17. Of course, this is only guaranteed in a homogeneous world if and only if total tax liability is 
increasing with income. For the absolute case, see Moyes (1988). 
18. See Camarero and associates (1993), Pazos and associates (1995), and Lambert and Ramos (1996). 
19. The number of tax units with negative incomes, left out of the analysis, are 26 and 39 in 1986 
and 1988, respectively. 
20. It should be noticed that 147 tax units in 1986 and 1,590 in 1988 had both gross tax and tax 
liability equal toO. In 1988, this is mostly due to the fact that those tax units have pre-tax income below 
the legal minimum, which is 600,000 pesetas. The main reason for the remaining cases in 1988 and 
those of 1986 is that they receive irregular income. 
21. Pre-tax welfare becomes negative for y = \E~ and large values of X, which is the reason why 
no estimates are recorded in Table 6 for these cases. 
22. For the relative case, Salas and Perez-Villacastin (1992) report a worsening of the progressive 
contribution of deductions during this period. Given that deductions raise tax units' income, even a 
moderate improvement in relative inequality can be compatible with a worsening of absolute inequality. 
23. For previous results on these matters, see Argimon and Gonzalez-Paramo (1987), Jimenez and 
Salas (1991), and Lasheras and associates (1994). 
24. Pazos and associates (1994) report the opposite result. They study two stages: the effect of the 
tax schedule on taxable income (i.e., pre-tax income less all allowable exemptions), and the effect of 
all tax credits as a whole. They find that the tax schedule on taxable income creates HI, but that the tax 
credits reduces it. 
25. See Castaner (1991 b), Pazos and associates (1994), and Lambert and Ramos (1996). 
26. The number of tax units for which we have direct information on irregular income, is 166 and 
308 in 1986 and 1988, respectively. In addition, we estimate that another 159 and 67 units in each year 
should be classified in this group. The criteria is that the difference P(y') - GT(y) is greater than a lower 
bound equal to 3,000 pesetas. Thus, 225 and 375 tax units, representing 3.0 and 3.1 percent of the sample 
in 1986 and 1988, respectively, qualify for the treatment of irregular income described above. 
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